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empathy, are all understood to be central to the empathetic process. The article promotes 
the view that studying the relationship between empathy and language should be grounded 
in the analysis of real-life interactions. Language evolves in social interaction both 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically, and is not only an important product but also a means 
of human sociality. The authors suggest that the best approach for analyzing the empathy–
language interface combines the theoretical insights of cognitive grammar with the method 
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shown, and through a careful analysis of grammatical devices, offer an explanation of 
whether the displays of affect are derived from the other person’s situation. By analyzing 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent decades, there has been an upsurge in the study of empathy in several fields of 
science, especially in biology, anthropology, developmental psychology and social 
neuroscience. Biologists are rethinking the role of pro-social behavior in human 
evolution: whereas evolutionary studies have traditionally laid heavy stress on 
competitiveness, last decades have emphasized the role of co-operation and mutual help 
in the survival and development of the human species. It has been suggested that empathy 
functions as the key mechanism in understanding other people and cooperating in an 
intelligible manner; it can thus be seen as a core mechanism of intersubjectivity (Zlatev 
2008:223). 
According to the sociobiologist and anthropologist Hrdy (2009), the human ability 
to empathize and co-operate can be traced back to our model of co-operative reproduction. 
Human mothers typically parent more than one child at the same time: children can be 
born even once a year, but a child needs to be taken care of for many years after its birth. 
Hrdy suggests that the Homo sapiens could not have evolved if mothers had been required 
to raise the offspring on their own. Children of different ages needed to be cared for by 
other close members of the group as well, typically by close relatives, and this 
complicated and contingent form of child caring required both males and females to 
invest heavily in social skills for co-operation. Such behavior required empathy: the 
ability to take into account the actions and intentions of other individuals, as well as the 
will to co-ordinate actions jointly and to behave in a pro-social manner, for the benefit of 
others. 
 The developmental psychologist Tomasello’s concept of cultural intelligence also 
stresses the importance of co-operation: all cultural evolution and the accumulation of 
knowledge has been made possible by the human ability to take others into account, to 
set mutual goals and co-ordinate joint activities. According to Tomasello et al. (2005), 
the ability to co-operate and have joint intentions sets humans apart from other species; 
this, on its part, has required an ability to read other individuals’ intentions, as well as 
cultural learning. Foremost, it is made possible by the presumably unique ability and will 
that humans have for sharing psychological states. The ability to participate in joint 
actions has provided the setting for such forms of cultural cognition that we now see as 
essentially human. Furthermore, it has made possible the use of linguistic symbols in the 
construction of social norms and individual beliefs, as well as social interaction, social 
relations and social institutions. (Zlatev 2008:236,238; Enfield 2013:xviii.) 
Within linguistics, the importance of empathy as a core mechanism of 
intersubjectivity has come to be studied only in recent years (Itkonen 2008, 2009; Zlatev 
2008; Herlin & Visapää 2011). Even within these studies it has mostly been approached 
in a theoretical way, e.g. with respect to the evolution of language. In this article, we wish 
to make a contribution to this discussion by exploring empathy both from a theoretical 
and empirical perspective. While the data is mostly analyzed using methodological tools 
of conversation analysis (CA), we will also make use of theoretical concepts of cognitive 
grammar (CG), such as the concept of ground (on combining CA with CG, see Etelämäki 
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et al. 2009; Etelämäki & Visapää 2014). In what follows, we will briefly discuss the ways 
in which cognitive linguistics and CA address issues related to language and empathy. 
Inspired by phenomenology, cognitive linguistics approaches human beings and 
their relationship to language by stressing the bodily basis of experience-in-the-world. 
Human cognition is seen to depend fundamentally on the body and its neuro-
physiological mechanisms, as well as on bodily-based experience of the world (e.g. 
Lakoff 1983; Talmy 2000; Levinson 2003.) Cognitive linguistics can be seen to have a 
body-based theory of meaning, which describes cognition as inherently dependent on 
embodiment, the sensory and motorical systems of the body as well as the bodily 
experiences and interactions with the world (Violi 2007). A radical version of an 
embodied understanding of meaning can be found in Lakoff and Johnson (1999), who 
claim that the human cognition and language are organized through image-schematic 
model: our conceptual structure emerges with respect to spatial relations and the settings 
we find ourselves in, and in this way, the spatially constructed image schemas function 
as the tools with which we conceptualize all of our experience, e.g., through metaphoric 
extensions. 
It has, however, become increasingly more common in cognitive linguistics to 
underline the fact that human interaction precedes all image schematic models. After its 
birth, the human child comes to be embraced not only by “the world” but also, and 
perhaps more essentially, by other human beings. Stressing this, Kimmel (2007) suggests 
that the cognitive theory of language should widen its perspective by exploring the 
inherent relationship between embodied intentionality, agentivity and the human self, and 
then focus on the “shared” and “distributed” essence of embodiment. Since all meaning 
is created in interaction, embodied experience can be understood only by investigating 
the ways in which perception is grounded in human sociality. 
 Studying the relationship between empathy and language should thus also be 
grounded in the analyses of real-life interactions. Language evolves in social interaction 
both phylogenetically and ontogenetically (Schegloff 1996; Zlatev 2008), and it is not only 
an important product but also a means of human sociality. In the words of Zahavi 
(2014:107),”any convincing theory of social cognition should be able to account for our 
face-to-face encounters with others”. 
 In our view, the best approach for analyzing empathy–language interface combines 
the theoretical insights of cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987, 2008) with the method of 
conversation analysis. We find that some concepts of CG are useful in analyzing the ways 
in which the empathetic sharing is related to the linguistic construal of the speech situation, 
but these tools do not give us access to the interactional side of the process. CA, on the 
other hand, analyzes human interaction in naturally occurring settings, where talk-in-
interaction is understood as a form of joint action (Sacks 1992; Schegloff 2007). In this 
framework, language is treated as a vehicle for carrying out actions in interaction, and the 
interpretation of actions is seen to depend on the constantly renegotiated context. That is, 
no conversationalist can decide alone what the “meaning” of their turn is, or what it is that 
they are doing. Each next turn is interpreted as displaying an understanding of its prior turn: 
every “second” turn thus provides the speaker of the “first” turn an understanding of what 
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is going on and, at the same time, renews the context for the talk to come. In this way, the 
conversation analytic method provides one with tools for scrutinizing mechanisms of 
intersubjectivity. Combining it with the cognitive tradition therefore offers a fruitful 
starting point for broadening the study of empathy to encompass interactional phenomena, 
which are, in fact, deeply intertwined with our more “general” cognitive capacities. 
Although the study of subjective emotions has been scarce within CA (Peräkylä 
2012:282–283), the notion of empathy comes up rather frequently (Jefferson 1984, 1988; 
Ruusuvuori 2005, 2007; Hepburn & Potter 2007, 2012; Heritage 2011; Couper-Kuhlen 
2012; Heritage & Lindström 2012a; Voutilainen 2012; Kupetz 2013; Voutilainen et al. 
2015).i Due to the methodological principle of relying on the interpretations presented in 
the next turn, a considerable amount of attention has been given to the ways in which 
interactants react to each other’s emotions (Peräkylä 2012:282–283), and empathetic 
reactions have thus fallen under the scope of CA. However, the concept tends to be used 
as if it was referring to an indivisible phenomenon; the complex nature of empathy is 
rarely discussed (cf. Heritage 2011; Kupetz 2013). 
In this article, we suggest that the multidimensional nature of empathy should be 
studied in the context of natural conversation. Furthermore, we will suggest that 
combining the methods of CA and the theoretical insights of CG can help us better 
understand how we can get hold of the multidimensional and sometimes even evasive 
nature of empathy, as it unfolds in real-life encounters. In what follows, we will first go 
through the various definitions of empathy, as well as the way in which we understand 
empathy (Section 2). In Section 3, we analyze a troubles-telling sequence with the 
methods of CA, and then proceed to look at the same data through the lens of CG (Section 
4). In the last section of the paper, we will present a summary our main findings.  
 
 
2. DEFINITIONS OF EMPATHY 
 
The definitions of empathy vary significantly across the fields, often with conflicting 
tones even within one discipline. Empathy is generally used to refer to the cognitively 
complex process in which one is able to stand in the shoes of another person: to 
understand their perspective, emotions and the situation they are in. For a long time, 
empathy was considered a distinctively human ability, but lately it has been suggested 
that some primates, especially chimpanzees, are able to behave in an empathetic manner, 
too (e.g. Koski & Sterck 2010). It has been proposed that the ability to empathize requires 
the ability to distinguish between the self and the other, and it would thus require a theory 
of mind: an individual that can understand that other individuals have a consciousness, 
thoughts and feelings different from one’s own (Hoffmann 2000; Blair 2005; Preston & 
de Waal 2002; Tomasello 2003). (For a critical discussion on theory of mind, see Zahavi 
2014:99–102). 
A crucial question has been whether empathy should be described as primarily a 
cognitive or an affective phenomenon. Many psychologists have defined empathy as 
the ability to enter the other person’s mind, as “the intellectual or imaginative 
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apprehension of another’s condition or state of mind” (Hogan 1969), or as a process of 
“entering another’s world without prejudice” (Rogers 1975:4). 
If we conceived of empathy as an ability to understand the other person's 
perspective, we could easily detect a display of empathy in the following excerpt: 
 
(1) (sg.346) 
 
01 Kirsi: sis:, (0.4) omii henkilökohta#sii juttuja# mitkä niin#ku#, 
                   PRT             OWN-PAR-PL PRIVATE-PAR-PL THIS-PAR-PL THAT LIKE 
    I mean (0.4) own personal things that like 
 
02 Saila: joo, 
      PRT 
    yea 
 
03        (.) 
 
04 Kirsi: m, (0.4) käsittelyssäh, (0.4) kestää k(h)au(h)an, 
                   PRT         PROCESS-NIMLZ-INE          LAST-3SG LONG 
               m, (0.4) in process (0.4) will take a long time 
 
05        (0.4) 
 
06 Saila: joo. 
               PRT 
               yea 
 
In this example, Kirsi is starting to share a troublesome experience: she is explaining 
her friends why she has not been able to participate in the events being talked about. 
She describes her experience with generic noun phrases (own personal things that like, 
in process l. 1, 4) together with the so-called zero person construction (will take a long 
time). These constructions are grammatically unspecified with regard to whose 
experience is being talked about, although the context makes it clear that Kirsi is 
sharing her own experience. With these constructions, she can, however, open up her 
own experience recognizable to the other recipients (Laitinen 2006).   
Saila responds to Kirsi’s turn twice with the particle joo (l. 2, 6). Sorjonen (2001) 
suggests that when joo is used as a response to an affiliation-relevant utterance, such as the 
one Kirsi produces on line 1 and 4, it merely registers the prior utterance as understood but 
does not affiliate with it. The joo response is thus, in this context, a linguistic resource with 
which the participant registers the prior turn and shows acknowledgment of what has been 
said without treating the utterance as one to be affiliated with. (Sorjonen 2001:132.) If one 
were to define empathy as the ability to understand the other person's perspective, Saila's 
joo responses could be seen to be empathetic. As a matter of fact, if we accepted this as the 
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full definition of empathy, any utterance that claims an understanding of the other person's 
turn in a coherent manner would fall under the notion of empathy. 
Within psychology, a research line that stresses the affective component of empathy 
has been more influential than the one focusing on the cognitive side of the process. Rather 
than seeing empathetic experience as a process of understanding the other’s perspective, it 
has thus underlined the centrality of feeling with the other. According to Stotland (1969), 
when empathizing, the recipient reacts in an emotional manner, because he or she perceives 
another person experiencing a certain emotion. This definition made the concept too wide, 
however, as it made it cover such emotions as pity and schadenfreude (‘malicious 
pleasure’). Since the 1980s, careful conceptual differences have been established between 
different kinds of emotional reactions, especially with regard to whether an emotion 
involved in an empathetic experience is automatic, whether it is cognitively processed and 
whether it can be seen to be primarily oriented towards the self or the other. (SEP; 
Ruusuvuori 2005:205–206.) Today, several leading psychologists define empathy as a 
multi-level process, which requires emotional involvement in the other’s feelings (Preston 
& de Waal 2002; Hoffman 2000; Singer 2006). In this view, empathy consists of a 
cognitive representation of the other's feelings but also of an emotional component. (Blair 
2005; Preston 2007, Preston et al. 2007.) 
An important part of this multidimensional process is the primary, automatic 
orientation to another person's emotional state, which is commonly referred to as 
emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is based on the functioning of mirror neurons, 
a sequence of events in which people transfer their emotions to others (Rizzolatti & 
Graighero 2004; Arbib 2012). This kind of emotional experience is based on an 
automatized copying of the others' emotions: people can end up feeling the same emotions 
simply because of their physical proximity and the neurological processes thus activated: 
a smiling face makes one smile, laughter catches on easily, and euphoria and panic spread 
quickly. Unlike cognitively processed empathy, emotional contagion does not require an 
understanding of the other person as the source of the emotion; on the contrary, people 
often see such emotions as deriving from themselves (Scheler 1973:22). Emotional 
contagion has been used to explain, for instance, the process in which a baby starts to cry 
as a reaction to another baby’s crying. The underlying assumption is that children of this 
age are not yet capable of distinguishing between the self and the other (Hoffman 2000:65; 
cf. Zahavi 2014), but that they start to imitate the emotional reactions of their surroundings. 
(Zlatev 2008:222–224; Hari & Kujala 2009:466.) 
In this article, we adopt the definition of empathy as a multidimensional process, 
in which all of the above mentioned dimensions are intertwined (see also Preston & de 
Waal 2002a; Hoffman 2000; Preston 2007). That is, the empathetic process includes an 
affective and a cognitive dimension as well as the dimension of emotional contagion. We 
find our position to be in line with that of Eisenberg & Fabes 1990, who define an 
empathetic phenomenon as follows: 
  
An affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of an
 other’s emotional state or condition, and that is similar to what the other person 
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 is feeling or would be expected to feel. 
 
We thus understand empathetic phenomena as reactions to the other’s emotional state or 
condition that involve both an affective and a cognitive side. Some kind of affective 
reaction stemming from the other’s situation is always a requirement for a reaction to be 
empathetic. However, there also needs to be an understanding of the affect stemming 
from the other’s situation; any displays of such an understanding is what we refer to as 
the cognitive side of the process. A less conscious orientation to the other, “mirroring”, 
can, however, also function as a dimension of the affective side of the empathetic process. 
In this sense, we will operate with the same dimensions as discussed earlier in this 
section: 1) emotional contagion, 2) a cognitive dimension, 3) an affective dimension. 
What is central to our approach is that we are dealing with a multidimensional 
phenomenon, where one of these dimensions can be foregrounded in a given context, and 
that the orientations to the dimensions can be attested in different combinations. Here, 
we agree with the conversation analyst Kupetz (2013:27), who states that “in order to 
account for the different types of resources which can be used to display empathy in 
social interaction, it may be useful to conceptualize empathy displays not only as displays 
of understanding the other person’s emotional situation, but as displays that range from 
more affect-oriented -- to more cognition oriented comprehension”. She also underlines 
an important fact that comes up clearly in our own data, too: the empirical correlates for 
affective and cognitive sides of empathy are not attestable as dichotomies, but they are 
constantly renegotiated in the unfolding of the sequences (Kupetz ibid.) 
 While we rely on an affect-oriented definition when analyzing the displays of 
empathy in interaction, we also want to underline the role of empathy as a crucial element 
of the larger intersubjective machinery at play in all interaction. In addition to observable 
affective displays, empathy can be seen as a key mechanism in understanding other 
people and co-operating in an intelligible manner (Zlatev 2008:223, Hrdy 2009; Zahavi 
2014). Our linguistic ability is primarily based on joint activity as well as our ability to 
understand the other individual’s perspective, intentions and emotions, and the core 
mechanism that enables this is our ability to empathize with the other (Zlatev 2008:223). 
Joint activity can thus be seen to rely on empathetic processing, irrespective of whether 
we actually display empathy or not. In this sense, empathy can be seen to be a key element 
in joint activity and language use: language and interaction ‘forces’ us to be empathetic 
to a certain degree, whether we give any signs of our relating to the others or not. 
 When approaching empathy from this perspective, it comes close to the 
definitions of intersubjectivity (cf. the way the concept is defined in this collection). For 
us, to highlight this larger understanding of empathy is to suggest that empathy does not 
only involve displays of affective and/or cognitive involvement, but that it is a key 
mechanism in the way that the participants manage joint activities and joint agency (see 
Enfield 2013:35). Although this idea needs to be developed further in another setting, we 
will briefly come back to the ways in which the construal of the ground (including the 
relationship of the participants) is related to the sharedness of the ongoing action (see 
Section 4).  
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3. THE DIMENSIONS OF EMPATHY IN LIGHT OF CONVERSATION 
 
We will now analyze an excerpt of conversational data to investigate the ways in which 
the dimensions of empathy are present in everyday interactional encounters and how this 
can elucidate our understanding of language-empathy interface. Some observations have 
been made about empathic ‘devices’ in the previous studies on conversations. Couper-
Kuhlen (2012:126) has found out in her study on the affiliative responses on complaints 
stories that prosody is a “primordial” way of expressing empathy. Kupetz’s (2013) in-
depth study of empathy describes various response types that can be seen to display 
empathy in affect-laden tellings of personal experiences. (On empathetic responses, see 
also Ruusuvuori 2005, 2007; Hakulinen and Sorjonen 2012; Voutilainen 2012.) While we 
find all these studies highly relevant and while we will adopt their sequential approach, in 
our analysis we want to underline the different dimensions of empathy and how they can 
be foregrounded and oriented to in different ways at different phases of interaction. 
In the following analysis, we focus on activities and gestures and, especially, on 
the grammatical structures used when empathy is expressed. As Stivers (2008) has noted, 
when studying how storytellers convey stance and how their hearers respond to it and 
convey affiliation, no response type as such can be said to be affiliating (also Couper-
Kuhlen 2012:114); what is crucial is the sequential context of the response. This is 
certainly true about grammatical structures involved in expressing empathy, too (see 
Kupetz 2013:22). In other words, while pointing to certain grammatical structures or 
response types we are not claiming that they are empathic as such. Our aim is rather to 
make some observations about the sequential contexts in which the different grammatical 
and prosodic features can be used in expressing different orientations to the dimensions 
of empathy. 
Our data consist of an hour of video recorded, face-to-face conversation between 
two middle-aged Finnish women, Kati and Taru, who are celebrating New Year’s Eve at 
Taru’s.ii They are sitting in armchairs, drinking champagne and talking about various 
matters. In the middle of the conversation, and starting the extract we are focusing on here, 
there is a troubles-telling sequence where Taru starts to complain about a strange rash in 
her hand. We will analyze this single conversation segment by segment, as we want to 
show in detail how the interaction unfolds; that is, instead of pointing out parts of the 
conversation where a certain dimension of empathy can be detected, we will go through 
the entire extract, highlighting the complex ways in which the dimensions come into play 
in different sequential contexts. 
When the extract starts, Kati starts to talk about how she does not like to eat 
crayfish in wintertime, because her skin gets very dry (l. 1–7)iii: 
 
(2) (sg.440) 
 
01 Kati     mulla (.) tulee (.) talvella =siks   mä en                   
 9 
       I-ADE       COMES       WINTER-ADE THEREFORE  I NEG-1 
     in the winter I get           that's why I 
  
02              talvella tykkää syödä rapuja        kun to:ta: mulon                  
        WINTER-ADE LIKE-3SG EAT CRAYFISH-PL-PAR BECAUSE PRT I-ADE HAVE-3SG 
      don't like to eat crayfish in the winter because I 
 
03               talvella AIna nä[ä sellaset #e                  
       WINTER-ADE ALWAYS  DEM    LIKE 
       always have these like that in the winter 
 
04 Taru:                              [mullaki on. joo,                                        
            I-ADE-CLI HAVE-3SG  PRT 
                                            me too.     yea 
 
05 Kati:       .hh kuivat ja pahat                         
           DRY-PL   AND  BAD-PL 
                    dry and bad 
 
06 Taru:     =.h mä: ihme>ttelin< mikä mul   on   tullu                         
 1SG   WONDER-PST-1SG   WHAT I-ADE HAVE-3SG COME-PAST 
                        I was wondering what I have 
 
07             niinku <täältä> <kuivaa> kato.                 
       PRT       HERE-ABL     DRY-PAR  LOOK-IMP. 
                 like it's so dry here you see. 
 
08       (0.5) 
 
09 Kati:    >joo<. (0.8) .hhh (0.3) muon kaikki (.)                    
                        PRT                                 I-ADE.3SG  ALL 
                   yea                    I have all 
 
10              [siis ihan #e-eö:# ahh hilseilee.          
          PRT   PRT                         PEAL.OFF-3SG 
                   like it #e-eö:# ahh peals off. 
 
11 Taru:    [siis mul on (.) mä ##o  rannekellon heittäny                    
                       PRT  I-ADE HAVE-3 I BE-1SG WRISTWATCH-GEN THROW-PST 
                  like I have (.) I have thrown my wristwatch 
 
12              po:is =kun (0.2) >mmul< (.) m tiedä mistä,                   
                      AWAY   CONJ          I-ADE           KNOW-NEG  WHERE 
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                  away because      I      don't know where, 
 
At the beginning of the extract, the women find out that they have experienced 
something similar: they both experience dryness of hands in the wintertime. Kati 
delivers her observation about the dry hands (l. 1–3), and Taru produces an overlapping 
turn in which she says that she shares the experience (l. 4), followed by Kati's 
specification that her hands are “dry and bad” (l. 5).  
Taru then repeats the fact that she has been wondering what she has on her own 
hands: she looks down to her hands and says that they feel very dry (l. 6-7). This turn is 
followed by a 0,5 seconds pause, followed by Kati’s joo (l. 9), a recognition of what has 
been said. Kati does not encourage Taru to elaborate on her rash, but goes back to her 
own initial worry. Now, she uses an extreme case formulation (I have all, like it peals 
off, Pomerantz 1986; Sidnell 2004): she is still talking about the dryness of her hands, 
now reformulating that all of her skin is dry. 
What becomes clear later in the conversation is that Taru is initiating a troubles-
telling sequence by calling attention to her rash. Here we refer to Jefferson (1984, 
1988), who has shown the intricate ways in which the troubles-telling sequences are 
organized, calling attention to the ways in which the participants delicately navigate 
through these sequences by moving from business-as-usual to trouble and back. 
According to Jefferson (1988:420), troubles-telling consists roughly of the following 
segments: A) Approach, B) Arrival, C) Delivery, D) Work-Up, E) Close Implicature, F) 
Exit. In the extract seen above, Taru is producing turns that are ambiguous in their 
trouble-implicativeness; in fact Kati either fails to recognize the approach or, due to the 
ambiguous nature of Taru’s turn, chooses to react to it in a neutral way, still keeping the 
possibility open for a “neutral” business-as-usual. (Jefferson 1988:422–423.) (For a 
detailed analysis of the same conversation as a troubles-telling sequence, see Etelämäki 
& Visapää 2014:481–486.) 
Nevertheless, when examining this extract from the perspective of empathy, the 
way in which the women mimic each other’s movements becomes a focus of interest. 
When Kati first talks about her dry hands, she is looking down at them, moving them and 
rubbing them softly. Taru almost immediately starts to simulate these movements: she 
lifts her hands, starts to rub them and looks down at them. She is thus imitating Kati's 
movements, and then starts to talk about the irritating rash in her hands. 
This could be used as a textbook example of mirroring, which might or might not 
lead to emotional contagion. As discussed previously, the mirror neuron system can 
makes us mimic each other's movements, expressions and emotional states. In the 
example discussed, mirroring seems to have an interactional consequence: the women 
first imitate each other’s hand movements, and then end up negotiating whose experience 
will be the focus of talk. Although emotional contagion is hard to track through linguistic 
and interactional analysis – we cannot know whether the participants are 'really' 
emotionally synchronized –, we suggest that the ways in which participants imitate e.g. 
each other’s behavior, body postures, prosody and linguistic structures can be a fruitful 
starting point for observing the synchronization involved in all empathetic understanding. 
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(On resonance, see Du Bois & Giora 2014; also Schegloff 1998.) 
As the conversation continues, Taru describes her rash more specifically and 
announces the trouble (l. 11–14) (see Jefferson 1988:424–423). Here, Kati drops her own 
project and leans over to Taru and produces an announcement response (l. 15), which by 
displaying empathy, commits her as a troubles-recipient (see Jefferson 1998:425): 
 
(3) 
 
11 Taru:    [siis mul on (.) mä ##o  rannekellon heittäny                    
                        PRT  I-ADE HAVE-3 I BE-1SG WRISTWATCH-GEN THROW-PST 
                like I have (.) I have thrown my wristwatch 
 
12           po:is =kun (0.2) >mmul< (.) m tiedä mistä,                   
                  AWAY   CONJ          I-ADE           KNOW-NEG  WHERE 
               away because      I      don't know where, 
 
13           mä en tiedä mistä tää taas on tullu                   
                   I NEG-2SG KNOW-NEG WHERE  DEM  AGAIN BE-3 COME-PST 
               I don't know where this has come from again  
 
        (Kati leans forward 
         to better look at Kati’s hand) 
14          tämmös[t ihme (pahaa).                   
                   THIS.KIND-PAR PRT    BAD-PAR  
               this kind of like weird bad 
 
15 Kati:               [se on ihan pahana? herrajjumala                            
                                    DEM BE-3G PRT BAD-ESS   LORD.GOD 
                             it's really bad    oh my god  
 
16            ku  se  on  paha.                  
                    CONJ DEM BE-3SG BAD 
                it's so bad. 
 
We can thus see how the troubles-telling sequence is arrived at and responded to in an 
empathetic way. We suggest that Kati’s turn shows an empathetic orientation to the trouble 
at hand in a both cognitive and affective manner. First of all, the lexical choices in Kati's 
turn are affective as such, but it is the prosody in her turn – the turn is produced with a 
whispering sound – and the way in which she leans closer to look at Taru’s hand that 
suggest affective involvement. (Cf. Jefferson’s 1988:420.) The cognitive orientation to the 
fact that this affect stems from the other’s situation can best be explain with respect to 
pronouns. By using the demonstrative tää in line 13, Taru offers her rash as an observable 
and interpretable object (Etelämäki 2009:34); it is at this point that Kati leans forward to 
 12 
look at it more closely. With the pronoun tää Taru also indicates that she has primary 
access to the symptoms in her hand: when she refers to her hand and her worry with tää and 
tämmöst, she marks it to be her subjective experience that she is sharing with the other 
(Etelämäki ibid.). When Kati then produces her response it is quite bad oh my god it’s bad 
(l. 15–16), she uses the pronoun se, which construes the hand as known enough for present 
purposes (Etelämäki 2009:34). The worry about the hand is now a shared, known referent 
for both of the interactants, and Taru’s rash has become the shared object of concern. 
Taru continues to describe the symptoms more carefully and thus moves to the 
exposition phase of the sequence (l. 18–19). According to Jefferson (1998), the 
exposition is typically followed by “affiliative turns” (“with expressions of ‘empathy’, p. 
42). Here, however, Kati gives advice: Taru should go and see a doctor (l. 20).  
 
(4) 
 
18 Taru:    >n< vähän aikaa. hetken  oli  poissa ja                           
                       SOME TIME-PAR MOMENT-GEN BE-3SG-PST  AWAY AND 
          for some time now. for a moment it was gone and 
  
19            ny[t taas 
                    NOW AGAIN 
    now again 
 
20 Kati:       [käy  lääkäris  näy[ttämäs,                  
    GO-IMP DOCTOR-INE SHOW-3INF-INE 
           go show it to the doctor 
 
21 Taru:                          [mä oon käyny                                                
                         I  BE-1 GO-PST 
                              I have been 
 
22                eikä se osan[nu sanoo mitään                 
                    NEG-3SG 3SG CAN-PST  SAY-INF ANYTHING 
           eikä s/he wasn’t able say anything           
 
23 Kati:                          [eikä tiedä.                            
                      NEG-3G KNOW-INF  
                 eikä doesn't know 
                  
Kati delivers her advice by using an imperative construction  käy lääkäris näyttämäs 
(go show to the doctor, l. 20). With the imperative, she can be seen to impose her own 
perspective to suggest an action that Taru controls (see Lauranto 2013:181). She does 
thus not adopt Taru’s perspective but rather gives advice, which as such instantiates an 
asymmetry between the advice giver and the recipient (see Heritage & Lindström 
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2012b:170). Her turn could, in other words, be seen to have a pro-social, sympathetic 
motivation that aims to help the other, but it cannot be considered to be empathetic. 
Taru responds by saying that she has already visited the doctor but that he or she 
didn’t ‘have anything to say’ (l. 21–22). Kati responds to this turn with a subjectless 
third person construction eikä tiedä (doesn't know) (l. 23). After the advice seen in the 
previous excerpt, she is now producing an “affiliative response” to Taru’s exposition 
(Jefferson 1998:428). Jefferson considers this to be typically the emotionally hightened 
segment of the troubles-telling sequence. Kati’s turn is interpreted in an affective way 
due to its sequential position, and through linguistic analysis, we can see how she 
adopts Taru’s perspective. Semantically, she reformulates Taru's turn: she produces a 
turn with an anaphoric person reference, where (an implied) third person ‘does not 
know what’s wrong’. The fact that she uses a subjectless third person construction 
echoes the perspective of Taru's turn: the subject of Kati’s turn is interpreted to be the 
same as that of Taru’s; Kati has thus syntactically adopted Taru's perspective. Although 
Kati's turn is syntactically similar to Taru's and it adopts its subject, she changes the 
tense from past to present, thus marking her affiliation's relevance for the ongoing 
moment. Her turn thus orients both to the affective and cognitive dimensions of 
empathy. Also, the fact that Kati designs her turn to echo Taru's turn can be seen as an 
example of the synchronization of grammatical structures (see also Du Bois & Giora 
2014), possibly related to emotional contagion. 
After this, Taru reformulates what she has said before: although she went to the 
doctor, it is not exactly that the doctor didn’t have a diagnosis but that she has not 
remembered to call for the results (l. 24–25): 
 
(5) 
 
22            eikä se osan[nu sanoo mitään                  
                    NEG-3SG 3SG CAN-PST  SAY-INF ANYTHING 
       eikä s/he wasn’t able say anything           
 
23 Kati:             [eikä tiedä.                            
     NEG-3G KNOW-INF  
    eikä doesn't know 
 
24 Taru:     =tai se (v)otti verikokeet >mut mäen o                     
                       OR  3SG TAKE-PST BLOOD.TEST-PL  BUT I NEG-1 BE  
       I mean s/he took bloodtests but I haven't 
 
25            muistanu< soittaa niit  tuloksii  =mä valitin                   
                    REMEMBER-PST CALL-INF DEM-PAR RESULT-PL-PAR I COMPLAIN-PST-1 
                remembered to call for the results I was complaining about 
 
26            koko kättä  ku (.) tämä, .hhhhh ja sitte 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                    WHOLE HAND-PAR PRT       DEM             AND THEN 
    the whole arm because this .hhhh and then  
 
27            ku  tätä  jomottelee pitkin #täältä# ja,                  
                    CONJ DEM-PAR HURT-3SG     ALONG     HERE-ABL  AND   
               because this hurts all the way here and  
 
28           (3.7) 
 
29 Taru:     e- ei taas nyt just. mut et jossai vaihees                   
                     NEG NEG  PRT  NOW  RIGHT. BUT  PRT  SOME    POINT-INE 
      n- not right now. but like at some point 
 
30            aina niingu (.) niinku koko käsi on sellane#.                 
                    always like           like    whole hand    is like.that 
     it always like  like the whole arm is like 
 
31            (1.4)  
 
32           #tekis miel# niinkun hh (0.3) vaan (.)                   
                     FEEL.LIKE-3SG   LIKE                 JUST 
     you just feel like      (0.3) like (.) 
 
33            kietoa  se johonki [villaan ja #(antaa olla)#                 
                    WRAP-INF DEM SOME-ILL   WOOL-ILL  AND    LET-INF BE-INF  
                wrapping it in something like wool and let it be 
 
34 Kati:                                [toittavast toi ei  liity   nyt                                          
                 HOPEFULLY     DEM NEG BE.CONNECTED PRT 
                                  hopefully  it is not connected 
 
35            jotenki: si[ihen                
                    SOMEHOW DEM-ILL 
         somehow to that 
 
36 Taru:                   [mnii m[m m                           
                                  jea  mmmm 
 
37 Kati:                                [kammottavaa.                                    
            DREADFUL-PAR 
            dreadful 
 
38           (1.7) 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What becomes of special interest here are the body positions and the gaze of the 
women. Throughout her lengthy exposition (l. 24–33) Taru mostly looks down, 
changing her position, touching her hand and arm, whereas Kati sits like a Sphinx, 
leaning back, looking at Taru without a break (cf. Sacks 1984; Rossano 2012:310; see 
also Ruusuvuori & Peräkylä 2009), not moving or reacting in any way. In line 28, 
Taru's reaction shows that a response is indeed missing: after 3.7 seconds, she raises her 
gaze from her hands to quickly look at Kati. When Kati still does not move or say 
anything, Taru continues to describe her symptoms. After another long pause (1.4 
seconds) in line 31, Taru again takes the turn, this time describing how she feels like 
wrapping the hand in something woolen. Here, Kati produces an overlapping turn 
toivottavast toi ei liity nyt jotenkin siihen (‘hopefully it is not connected to’), a 
diagnostic turn that she does not finish. Taru shows, however, with her response nii mm 
m (l. 36) that she orients to shared knowledge; she claims to recognize the scenario 
implied in Kati's turn, and the women are thus diagnosing the rash together. The lexical 
choice of Kati’s next turn kammottavaa (‘dreadful’), as well as the way in which the 
turn is prosodically produced, displays strong affect and suggests that the shared 
knowledge refers to something unpleasant. As the pronoun toi in Kati’s turn (l. 34) 
construes a shared access to the referent and as Taru does not deny the diagnosis and 
affect displayed in Kati’s turns, both the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy 
are oriented to.iv  
 
 
4. THE LINGUISTIC CONSTRUAL OF THE GROUND AND THE DEGREE 
OF EMPATHETIC SHARING 
 
Next, we look at the same conversation from a cognitive grammar perspective, paying 
attention to the construal of the ground. In CG, ground is the term for speech event, 
including its immediate physical circumstances (place and time) as well as the 
participants and their shared knowledge (Langacker 1987, 1999). We are especially 
interested in whether the ground is symmetrically or asymmetrically construed, since it 
has been suggested that the more symmetrical its construal, the more it offers a place 
for a shared, affective perspective, as the participants (speaker & recipient) merge as a 
single conceptualizer (Etelämäki & Visapää 2014). 
The process where linguistic expressions are linked to the ground is called 
grounding. Languages have a set of elements for this purpose, grounding elements. 
Grounding elements are thus the means for specifying the relation between the 
expression and the speech situation (Langacker 1999: 219–220). These include tense 
markers, pronouns, demonstratives, and particles. In what follows, we focus on the use 
of demonstratives (tämä ‘this’, se ‘it’), tenses and pronouns and the ways in which they 
construe the relation between the participants, the utterance, and the speech event.  
 While mainstream CG analyzes the grounding of individual NPs (ungrounded 
dog vs. grounded the dog) or finite clauses (to speak vs. grounded he speaks), produced 
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by a single speaker who construes the ground by him/herself, our starting point is that 
the ground is dynamically co-construed (Etelämäki et al. 2009; Etelämäki & Visapää 
2014: 493–495; also Langacker 2014). What is of interest, then, from the perspective of 
empathy and 'feeling together', is to what degree the participants conceptualize the 
ground and themselves as part of the expression, and how they open up places for other 
interlocutors.  
The two other concepts of CG we need to bring up are the notions of subjectivity 
and objectivity. These concepts call attention to the role of observation by highlighting 
whether an entity has a role as an object or subject of observation. When an entity is 
construed objectively, it is the focus of attention; when it is construed subjectively, it 
remains implicit, and has a role as part of the observation process. Langacker (2008:77) 
illustrates this an analogy: when one wears glasses, the glasses are part of one’s visual 
system and therefore subjectively construed and non-salient. The glasses become 
salient, however, when taken off the nose, looked at and thus construed objectively. 
Similarly, the ground can be construed objectively or subjectively in a linguistic 
expression. The ground gets objectified when deictic expressions that make specific 
reference to the speech event are put ‘onstage’, that is, when they are profiled in the 
expression. Expressions that focus attention to the aspects of ground – such as the 
participants (1. and 2. p. pronouns), the place of the speech event (e.g. here) or the time 
of speaking (the temporal adverb now) – construe the ground objectively. Ground can 
also be activated with less explicit grammatical markers – grounding predications (in 
English, e.g. tense, articles and demonstratives). Here, some aspect of the ground 
functions as the reference point of the utterance without being explicitly mentioned; it 
is thus construed more subjectively. The third group are non-deictic elements that 
include no conventionalized indexical reference to the speech situation (e.g. table, 
between); this is what is referred to as the maximally subjective construal of the 
ground. (Langacker 1999: 219–220.) 
 When the ground is objectively construed by e.g. 1. and 2. personal pronouns, 
the conceptualization of the participants becomes asymmetrical: with the pronoun I, it 
is the currently speaking participant that profiles him/herself in the ground as the focus 
of attention. Similarly, even the more subtle ways of referring to the ground always 
suggest an asymmetrical construal of the ground (Etelämäki & Visapää 2014). 
Conversely, the less a turn is grounded, the less an expression posits grammatical 
asymmetries between the participants; that is, the construal is open for a fleeting 
“shared” perspective, and it can thereby invite shared understandings of the evaluated 
situations. 
What we would like to suggest is that there could be a correlation between the 
linguistic construal of the ground and the degree of empathetic sharing between the 
interactants: on the basis of our observations, the more symmetrical the ground between 
the participants, the more the participants are 'feeling together'. The construal of the 
ground could thus provide one solution to the me-us problem pointed out by Enfield 
(2013), a solution that shows how the separateness and boundedness of the participants 
is navigated through grammatical means. 
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 Let us revisit the data. From the perspective of construal, the first phase of the 
conversation can be seen in l. 1–14. In the entirety of this extract, both participants profile 
themselves as part of their turns using first person pronouns (e.g. mä ‘I’ in Taru's turns l. 6, 
11, 13 mullon ‘I have’; Kati l. 2, Taru l. 4). They thus explicitly objectify themselves in the 
ground. They both also objectify their hand as part of the ground, putting it onstage as the 
focus; however both are markedly talking only about their own hands. From the perspective 
of grounding, the participants can be seen to construe themselves in a maximally 
asymmetrical way; both underline their own perspective on the matter. This is further 
supported by the use of the demonstrative pronoun tämä in Taru's turn in line 13, as well as 
Kati's nää (plural from of tämä) in line 3; Etelämäki (2009) has shown that tämä typically 
indexes that the speaker has a primary access to the referent. 
 The way in which the participants profile themselves as parts of their expressions 
changes in l. 15: here Taru's hand becomes the primary object of concern for both 
participants. In lines 15–16, Kati produces a turn (se on ihan pahana herrajjumala ku se on 
paha, ‘it is quite bad oh my god it’s bad’), where the ground is more symmetrically 
organized. Here, the object of concern is referred to with the pronoun se, which indexes that 
the referent is symmetrically accessible to both participants (Etelämäki 2009). After this, 
however, Kati uses the imperative construction to give advice to Taru: with the imperative 
verb, she profiles the interaction of the speaker and hearer onstage, but does this markedly 
from her own perspective. In Taru’s response I have been to the doctor she profiles herself 
in the utterance, contesting Kati’s suggestion by saying that she has already done what 
Kati’s turn advice told her to do. 
The perspectives merge again in l. 23 when Kati produces the turn eikä tiedä 
('doesn't know') as a response to Taru’s turn (l. 22) eikä se osannu sanoo mitään (‘s/he 
wasn’t able say anything’). Here, Kati builds the interpretation of her anaphoric 
utterance on what Taru has said before, and the personal reference of the turn is 
interpreted with respect to the ground construal of Taru's turn. Interestingly, though, 
Kati uses the present tense unlike Kati, which positions the temporal reference of the 
utterance somewhat differently with respect to the ground, objectifying the present 
moment and thus marking the affiliation's relevance for the ongoing action. 
 After this, Taru produces a longer telling about visiting the doctor, and when Kati 
reacts to this (l. 34, 37), she construes her turns again in a symmetrical fashion: first using 
the pronoun tuo (‘that’) in toivottavasti tuo ei nyt liity siihen and then, in line 37, producing 
the adjectival phrase kammottavaa, which can be seen to be maximally subjective in 
Langackerian terms. As this free-standing phrase (kammottavaa, ‘dreadful’) is grounded 
only by the larger indexical setting of the ongoing action, it construes the ground in a 
maximally symmetrical way, thus offering a place for a shared perspective and affect 
(Etelämäki & Visapää 2014:492–493). 
 Our analysis of construing the ground and finding its connections to the ways in 
which the participants are ‘feeling together’ needs to be elaborated further. We hope to 
have shown, however, how the ways in which the sequences unfold has its reflection also in 
the grammatical organization of the ground. Whereas empathy can undoubtedly also be 
displayed with grammatical structures that profile the participants in an asymmetrical 
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position (e.g. ‘I feel for you’, ‘I think your situation is horrible’), our data invites us to see 
how moments of empathetic sharing are often built on a symmetrical construal of the 
ground. 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
In this article, we have approached the relationship between empathy and language, 
especially aiming at discussing the ways in which the different dimensions of empathy can 
be attested in naturally occurring interactional data. Also, we have tried to show what tools 
linguists have in analyzing such phenomena; in doing this, we have combined theoretical 
notions of cognitive grammar with the methodology of conversation analysis. Our main 
points can be summarized as followed: 
 
Empathy is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon. All of its dimensions – 
emotional contagion, cognitive and affective dimension – are central to the 
empathetic process. For a phenomenon to be empathetic, it needs to have an 
orientation to both the cognitive and affective dimensions of the process. We have 
shown how the methods of CA and the theoretical insights of CG can help us better 
understand the empathy-language interface. When analyzing natural conversation, 
we can do sequential and linguistic analysis of the ways in which affect is shown 
(the affective dimension of empathy), and through a careful analysis of the 
grammatical devices, offer an explanation of whether the displays of affect are 
shown to be derived from the other person’s situation (the cognitive dimension of 
empathy). It is important to see how the dimensions can be foregrounded in different 
ways: sometimes the cognitive dimension is highlighted, sometimes the affective 
dimension, and due to this it might be hard to see how all of the dimensions are 
always at work in empathetic moments. Analyzing the complex ways that these 
dimension are oriented to, linguistic analysis can give us concrete tools for forming 
a deeper understanding of how empathy happens in real-life encounters. 
 
In this article, we have also wanted to underline the pervasive nature of empathy in all 
language use and interaction. In addition to observable affective displays, empathy can be 
seen as a key mechanism in understanding other people and co-operating in an intelligible 
manner. Studying the architecture of everyday interactions shows in a tangible way how all 
intersubjective understanding requires empathetic involvement. 
In our view, if we want to do justice to the complex nature of empathy, various 
complementary accounts have to be integrated. In this article, we have presented one 
possible theoretical and methodological combination. Here, by combining the methodology 
of CA with the theoretical insight of CG, we have shown that it is through language, gaze, 
body and other conventionalized interactional practices that we can enact and display 
empathy. Furthermore, the concept of empathy cannot and should not be analyzed as a 
unitary, indivisible phenomenon: it consists of several dimensions, which are constantly 
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renegotiated. Consequently, empathy cannot be seen only as a characteristic of individual 
constructions or turns but it takes place in the interaction between the participants.  
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i Similar phenomena have been discussed under different terminology. The most used concepts are alignment 
or affiliation, the latter of which comes close to our definition of empathy. According to Sorjonen (2001), 
alignment shows that you understand what the other person says, whereas affiliation requires emotional, 
affective involvement. In a similar vein, Couper-Kuhlen (2012:113) defines affiliation as "the display of 
support and endorsement for a conveyed affective stance". Stivers (2008), on the other hand, uses the 
concepts somewhat differently, stressing that alignment should be understood as alignment with the other 
person's action, whereas as an affiliative turn is emotionally empathetic with the action. See also Kupetz 
2013:6–9. 
ii The data comes from the Conversational Data Archive at the University of Helsinki, and the abbreviations 
used (sg.440) refer to the code name of the conversation. 
iii Assumed cultural knowledge is that you eat crayfish with your hands. 
iv Kati seems to be behaving almost ‘like a therapist’, refusing a reaction in order to make the other 
speak. She does not display empathy, but a better description might be that she is being non-
empathetically empathetic. Instead of displaying empathy, she is oriented to making her friend go and see 
a doctor. 
